History Project Theses

Some observations from the history project to date.

Note these are working observations from the history project coordinator, and do not represent an official Association position (at least at present)

This list is an evolving work in progress, updated as we complete additional interviews. We welcome opportunity to debate items on the list – contact us

Why DDG51 was an initial success

1. Top notch crew
– Can argue whether should be first, or even on list. Propose the alternate view – see HUE / VIK where crews gave up after BL 6 & CEC disaster, took task force to drag them back into operation
– crew was immediately hands-on in shipyard, carried unstoppable energy through execution of DT and OT

2. Namesake
– nothing like carrying the Aegis of a real WWII Naval Hero, who happened to still be alive, watching, and motivating. This ship is built to fight …

3. Enterprise support
– Enough folks throughout the entire enterprise who wanted the program to succeed
– to the point of breaking or bending rules for that success
– vice just eating popcorn and watching the movie
– even though at the times it felt like we were on a windy corner

4. Informed and Involved Top Navy Leadership
– Top Navy leadership who knew what was needed to enable success – to the point of adjusting the design so it could survive the appropriation process
– Some folks claim political interference, but it turns out the leaders WERE correct and navigated between Scylla and Charybdis
– It is not political interference if you ARE the decision maker and make a correct decision

5. Shipyard dedicated to program success
– Company willing to take risk, even after they ran out of $
– like the pig, they were dedicated to the barbecue – was going to be a success or they may not survive
– Navy willing to partially bail out company to get ship completed – vice saying BIW eat the contract
– Related to #3 – who today would do this – the procuring contracting officer would have an absolute fit

6. Design that was just good enough
– Not perfect, some interesting things that could have been much better in Andy’s interview
– But leadership said pencils down, welders up
– A limited number of items did get changed late, but good ideas saved for later flights, some were forever precluded

7. Unity of Command through Program Office
– A lead office to make decisions, take off shoes and channel Khrushchev when the establishment was not responding
– Unity of command through the AEGIS DRPM
– even though the high water of the AEGIS project may have passed

8. Right people in the right place
– Lots of folks in the right place through the enterprise, had the correct experience to move the ship design and construction in the correct direction

9. Good tactical decisions
– Innumerable good tactical decisions during the course of the design and build.
– Almost an inevitable outcome of #3 and #8, folks wanted the success, they were in the right seats at the right time, able to make or influence good decisions
– Example – desrisking the propulsion plant with the NAVSSES hot plant, to the point of conduction a DT and OT.
– Not to say that every decision was correct – a preponderance that kept forward momentum and avoided sinkholes

10. Managed risk
– Everything was not new, many items carried over from Ticos and Spruances
– Observations from the Ticos and Spruances were not ignored, but smartly incorporated into DDG51. The design was built on a solid foundation of learning
– other than the gas turbine generators, which seemed to completely discard learning from Spruances, Kidds, and Ticos
– Shipyards had Tico learning that directly led to program success with the DDG51s
– One argument is that this is not separate – already covered by either #6 or #9, good design or correct tactical decisions

11. No social media
– a retrospective thought – everything was not successful. We lost load going through Coleman Bridge, throttle control problems, generator problems, electric plant failed initial OT, etc. All available energy went into problem resolution, not into combatting perceptions and narratives.

12. Momentum from the Cold War and Desert Storm
– The “peace dividend” concept had not yet appeared to start reducing budgets
– DDG51 was too late for Desert Storm, but that momentum remained at commissioning
– Specter of Soviet Union was still prevalent – many plank owners had employed early Tico cruisers in ops facing the Soviet Union (Black Sea Ops, Sea of Okhotsk, etc.)

Why DDG51 was an enduring success

1. No steam / LM2500s
– If you are going to ignore or underfund maintenance, steam is your worst enemy. And the LM2500s just kept going

2. Swiss Army Knife
– few missions it could not take on. Not single mission, or no mission (a little ship in search of a mission)

3. BMD / Phased Alternative Approach
– During dark ages of AEGIS, AEGIS BMD continued to upgrade, groom, train, and deploy ships
– Phased Adaptive Approach (BMD destroyers to Rota) – meant DDG51 got all the upgrades available, stayed operationally relevant

4. Robust hull design
– especially avoiding the superstructure crack drivers inherent in the Spruance / Tico design

5. Enough Maintenance
Despite dark ages of Aegis and fleet maintenance, leadership kept up maintenance sufficient to achieve the inherent capability in the design, extended to 40 years.

One unknown – we have all seen much younger ships that had been abandoned by their crews. But Arleigh wasn’t. Was this still the spectre of the Admiral? A really good set of ship leadership over the years? Good port engineers?

Why the DDG51 class was an enduring success

1. Program Leadership stability
– 12 PMs in 40+ years, even longer service by deputy PMs

2. Swiss army knife
– see above

3. BMD / PAA
– see above

4. Block approach to capability improvement
– limited built in growth margin did not preclude smart upgrades

5. Andy’s black hole theory
– Andy Summers interview page 7
– DDG51 was good enough it was hard to get a competing design into production
– DD1000 did not unseat it, and LCS definitely didn’t (on the contrary, they may have increased DDG51 demand). Does not appear Constellation will unseat DDG51 either, if it survives construction
– Actually reverse black-hole, as DDG51 was the black hole for DD1000 (CAPT John Ingram interview page 10)

6. Robust machinery plant
– LM 2500s keep going with minimum maintenance, no steam, the fleet survived the dark ages AEGIS and fleet maintenance collapse